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The Local Administrative Agencies
Maurice H. Merrill*
I. INTRODUCTION
We have become accustomed to the concept, once thoroughly
horrendous to most lawyers, that the dispensation of justice may, be
properly entrusted to those tribunals which, for want of a better term,
we label administrative. In past years they were considered the illicit
offspring of miscegenatious commingling of powers which,
constitutionally, should have been kept in rigid segregation. In the last
half century, this habit of thought has all but disappeared; our
concern has been rather with the full acknowledgment and acceptance
of these agencies into the family of makers and appliers of the law.
We have undertaken to nurture and instruct them in the etiquette of
the urbane administration of justice, and in the arts and the crafts of
the prudent government of men and things. Notable products of this
changed attitude are the various acts, federal and state, dealing with
administrative procedure. Also, we must call to mind the many
scholarly works on the general topic and specific phases of
administrative law, and the acceptance of this subject as a special title
in the encyclopedic searchbooks and the compendious digests of the
law.
We have been less atterntive to the multitude of administrative
agencies which operate at the local level. No less ancient in their
lineage-the existence of local agencies on these shores may be traced
back to colonial days'-we have only to look about us to sense their
importance in our lives. Inspectors of various sorts, zoning agencies of
diverse degrees of authority, licensing officers, street authorities,
personnel boards in the municipal government, and others must be
taken into account as we go about our daily vocations. The literature
of administrative law reform, however, for the most part, ignores the
local agencies. When they are noted, obscurely and in connection with
some point of the general law, the local nature of the tribunal is
*George Lynn Cross Professor of Law Emeritus, College of Law, The University of
Oklahoma.
I. Pennsylvania examples are cited in M. MERRILL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8 (1954). For general treatments, see C. BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN THE
WILDERNESS 55-93, 206-48, 364-407 (1938); E. GRIFFITH, HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY
GOVERNMENT 242-91 (1938).
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glossed over. In most cases, these tribunals are excepted from the
coverage of the state administrative procedure acts.2 The reason
generally given is that the local agencies cannot be expected to take
the time and trouble to comply with sophisticated refinements of
practice and procedure;3 strangely enough, when the local agency can
be found to be acting in fact as an instrumentality of the state, judges
encounter no difficulty in holding the agency to these "refined"
procedures.4 The statutes or ordinances which do govern local
administrative agencies are generally very sketchy and vague. When
we look at the cases, however, we find the courts applying a rather
sophisticated set of requirements to local administrative actions. One
may well wonder whether a well-drawn code would not help rather
than hinder the performance of those local bodies
It may be worth our while to see how the courts have dealt with
local administrative agencies under the conditions now prevailing.
Obviously, within the space here available, no exhaustive treatment of
statutes or authorities is possible. Accordingly, this study is largely
confined to the reported decisions of recent months, arranged in
accordance with a topical order commonly employed in writing on the
subject.
II. SOME BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
In a constitutional polity, based on a tripartite vesting of
governmental powers-legislative, executive, judicial-it has become
hackneyed to say that those agencies lodged in the executive
department, which nevertheless make rules like legislatures and
adjudicate like courts, occupy an anomalous position. Because the
department of the government wherein they are sheltered has no
tradition of continuously successful assertion of authority to enact or
2. E.g., Johnson Products, Inc. v. City Council, 353 Mass. 540, 233 N.E.2d 316 (1968).
But see Lee v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 442 P.2d 61 (Hawaii, 1968), applying HAWAII Rtv.
LAWS §6C-I (Supp. 1965); Davis v. Wilson, 96 Ill. App. 2d 225, 238 N.E.2d 237 (1968),
applying ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 264 (Smith-Hurd 1968); Glenn v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 440 P.2d I (Wyo. 1968), applying WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-276.19 (Supp. 1967). A
broad definition of agency as "any administrative officer or body existing under the constitution
or by-law and authorized by law to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases" has been the
source for application of a state review act to municipal agencies. State ex rel. Police Retirement
System v. Murphy, 359 Mo. 854, 224 S.W.2d 68 (1949), applying Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.010
(Supp. 1968).
3. See F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 97 (1965).
4. E.g., Lewis v. City of Grand Rapids, 222 F: Supp. 349 (W.D. Mich. 1963).
5. See F. COOPER, supra note 3, at 98.
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to judge,' we habitually say that there are no common law
administrative powers of rule-making or of judgment, and that the
agencies must find in statute all their authority to embark upon
activity of that sort. Examples are found in recent decisions of
determinations that both rule-making and adjudicative authority must
be confined to the limits set by statut&l and cannot be delegated to
some other functionary.' For example without legislative permission, a
city council may not vest in one of the municipal administrative
bodies a power of adjudicative decision from which an appeal may be
taken to a court. All this surely is sound. It cannot be good social
engineering to permit these subordinate bodies to rocket off into outer
space. Their centrifugal impulses are very well developed, and need to
be carefully restrained.
The constitutional requirement that legislative, executive and
judicial powers be kept separate does not apply to the state in
organizing its local units of government."0 Nonetheless, the concept of
separateness of function remains embedded in our political thought.
Statutes are interpreted with that concept in mind." Thus, while the
inapplicability of the separation of powers as a constitutional
principle may allow a local legislative body to be invested with
administrative adjudicative authority, 2 when it acts under such an
investiture, it is subject to the requirements of compliance with a
prescribed, legislatively set standard. 3 The question of its compliance
6. But see Benton, Administrative Subpoena Enforcement, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 874 (1963).
7. Beynon v. City of Scranton, 212'Pa. Super. 526, 243 A.2d 190 (1968) (rule-making);
Ziomek v. Bartimole, 156 Conn. 604, 244 A.2d 380 (1968) (adjudicative work).
8. South East Property Owners & Residents Ass'n v. City Plan Comm'n, 156 Conn. 587,
244 A.2d 394 (1968) (rule-making); Anderson v. Grand River Dam Auth., 446 P.2d 814 (Okla.
1968) (rule-making: certainly not delegable to private persons); Marquette Sav. & Loan Assoc. v.
Village of Twin Lakes, 38 Wisc. 2d 310, 156 N.W.2d 425 (1968). Of course, a mere resort to
other persons for information prior to action is not a delegation of discretion; Cooper v.
Community School Corp., 232 N.E.2d 887 (Ind. 1968).
9. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts., Inc. v. Parent Teachers Ass'n 443 P.2d 608 (Nev.
1968), overruled on rehearing as to anotherpoint, 451 P.2d 713 (Nev. 1969).
10. Pressman v. D'Alesandro, 193 Md. 672, 69 A.2d 453 (1949); State ex rel. Simpson v.
City of Mankato, 117 Minn. 458, 136 N.W. 264 (1912); Barnes v. City of Kirksville, 266 Mo.
270, 180 S.W. 545 (1915); Eggers v. Kenney, 15 N.J. 107, 104 A.2d 10 (1954).
II. Montano v. Lee, 401 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1968) (statute requiring bi-partisan political
representation on boards, committees or similar bodies not applicable to election of members of
board of aldermen, a repository of local legislative power); Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope,
Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 181 (1968) (council held not to have violated principle against
abdication of legislative power or to have transgressed controlling statute).
12. RK Dev. Corp. v. City of Norwalk, 156 Conn. 369, 242 A.2d 781 (1968); Morton v.
Township of Clark, 102 N.J. Super. 84, 245 A.2d 377 (1968).
13. J & M Realty Co. v. City of Norwalk, 156 Conn. 185, 239 A.2d 534 (1968); Town of
1969]
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therewith is a fit topic for judicial review. 4 A local agency is also
subject to the other legally enforcible standards of propriety
applicable to adjudicative activity. 5 Conversely, when the municipal
governing body decides whether an ordinance should be enacted,
amended or repealed, it acts legislatively; appellate processes adapted
to the review of "quasi-judicial" action accordingly are not available
to challenge its action." Relief, if available, can only be granted for
exceeding statutory authority or upon unconstitutionality, all in
accord with the established judicial remedies for unauthorized or
unconstitutional legislative enactment. 7
Other recent applications of the legislative-adjudicative
dichotomy-an outgrowth of the separation of powers
analysis-include statements that a hearing is not constitutionally
requisite to the exercise of a legislative discretion;"8 that a city
planning board, making recommendations to a municipal legislature
itself, cannot be regarded as a legislative body because of its lack of
ability to convert its recommendations into law;" that statutory
provisions governing the enactment or amendment of zoning
regulations have no bearing upon the decision of an action involving
review of a judicial-type decision of a town board in granting an
exception to a zoning ordinance."0 Other illustrations include decisions
recognizing the judicial status ("softened by a quasi") of boards
which pass upon the dismissal of a municipal employee' or grant
Cheektowaga v. Amico, 58 Misc. 2d 103, 294 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. 1968). See Young Men &
Women's Hebrew Ass'n v. Borough Council, 429 Pa. 283, 240 A.2d 469 (1968) where the court
suggests that a council, in passing on applications for conditional uses, possesses the attributes
of a legislative body, but it clearly holds the council to compliance with the standard set by
ordinance.
14. Town of Huntington v. Town Board, 57 Misc. 2d 821, 293 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct.
1968); Donnelly v. City of Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St. 2d I, 233 N.E.2d 300 (1968); Beerman
v. City of Kettering, 14 Ohio Misc. 144, 237 N.E.2d 641 (C.P. 1965); cj. Klein v. Village of La
Grange, 93 Ill. App. 2d 318, 236 N.E.2d 351 (1968), holding, perhaps erroneously, that the
village board's denial of a special use permit was non-appealable on the ground that denial
was "legislative."
15. RK Dev. Corp. v. City of Norwalk, 156 Conn. 369, 242 A.2d 781 (1968).
16. Stein v. Erie County Comm'rs, 16 Ohio Misc. 155, 241 N.E. 2d 300 (CP. 1968).
Contra, City of Sand Springs v. Colliver, 434 P.2d 186 (Okla. 1967) (clearly proceeds upon
erronerous reasoning).
17. Wilson v. Municipal Water Dist., 63 Cal. Rptr. 889 (Ct. App. 1968); City of The
Village v. McCown, 446 P.2d 380 (Okla. 1968).
18. Chevy Chase Village v. Board of App., 249 Md. 334, 239 A.2d 740 (1968).
19. Rosenberg v. Planning Bd. 155 Conn. 636, 236 A.zu 895 (1967).
20. Town oF Huntington v. Town Board, 57 Misc. 2d 821, 293 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct.
1968).
21. Civil Serv. Bd., v. Page, 2 N.C. App. 34, 162 S.E. 2d 644 (1968).
[VOL. 22
LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
relief from the rigors of zoning according to principles established in
a zoning ordinance
2
Thus, courts properly call the zoning administrators' attention to
the fact that it is not their business to cure the alleged deficiencies of
the ordinance, this being a matter for the body which possesses the
amending function.23
Recently, the problem of classification seems to have stymied the
Connecticut Supreme Court. The court was confronted with a
contention that a planning and zoning commission had sinned
procedurally in a hearing on a subdivision proposal. The court
pointed out that the applicable statute 4 made the grant of a hearing
entirely optional to the commission. The court then said:
A municipal planning commission, in exercising its function of approving or
disapproving any particular subdivision plan, is acting in an administrative
capacity and does not function as a legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial agency,
which would require it to observe the safeguards, ordinarily guaranteed to the
applicants and the public, of a fair opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to
inspect documents presented, and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal and
of the right to be fully apprised of the facts upon which action is to be taken
22
Apparently, in the court's view, the board, in this type of proceeding,
is neither fish, flesh, nor fowl. One hardly knows how- to fit this
decision, or, at least, the statements offered to support it, into
customary administrative law concepts. As the opinion later
recognizes, the board's function in passing upon the propriety of the
proposal under the applicable statutes and ordinances was to compare
the proposal with applicable legal standards.
It is difficult to understand why this function was not classified
as adjudicative. Also to be borne in mind is the somewhat
incomprehensible statement that the procedural niceties mentioned
should have been honored had the board been functioning as a
"legislative" agency. This, as we shall see, is not a generally held
tenet. The court, in the later stages of the opinion, makes a pretty
convincing case for the essential fairness of the procedure employed,
and perhaps the best thing we can do is to treat the decision as an
example of the application of the principle that even an adjudicative
22. Beach v. Board of Adjustment, 438 P.2d 617 (Wash. 1968).
23. Rosedale-Skinker Impr. Ass'n v. Board of Adjustment, 425 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1968);
Lincoln Plastic Prod. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 242 A.2d 301 (R.I. 1968).
24. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 8-26 (Supp. 1968).
25. Forest Constr. Co. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 155 Conn. 669, 674, 236 A.2d
917, 921 (1967).
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hearing need not always be of the trial type. Probably we had just as
well forget the unfortunate remarks about the peculiar nature of the
board.
The classification of local agency activity has also been discussed
in connection with a trio of decisions respecting delegation of
authority to a local tribunal subject to the approval of a state
administrative body;26 the propriety of licensing requirements which
exact from the licensee consent to inspections to check compliance
with applicable ordinances;2 7 and whether privilege attaches to a
statement made at a hearing on an application for a zoning variance,
as to alleged defamatory remarks contained therein.
28
III. DELEGATION OF POWERS: THE PROBLEM OF STANDARDS
A. Classification of Standards
The principle that power delegated to an administrative agency
must be subject to reasonably intelligible and directive standards is a
generally accepted axiom of our public law. Constitutionally, it is
regarded as based on the universally established distribution of
governmental powers amongst three departments, legislative, executive
and judicial, as well as on the basic guaranty against the deprivation
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. While some
distinguished scholars find restricted observance of and less utility in
this principle, I have argued, elsewhere, the reasons which seem to me
to make it a useful weapon in our armory of public law, 'J and in aid
of its better application, I tentatively presented a classification of the
cases according to the characteristics of the standards approved by the
courts 00 (I) specific prescriptions; (2) reasonably detailed portraiture
of legislative purpose; (3) imprecise standards, applied to limited
subject matter; (4) imprecise words, of acquired legal significance; (5)
26. Weinstein v. City of Newark, 100 N.J. Super. 199, 241 A.2d 478 (1968).
27. Belleville Chamber of Commerce v. Town of Belleville, 51 N.J. 153, 238 A.2d 181
(1968). This case must be viewed in light of Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). The opinion does not mention these decisions,
although they were handed down at a sufficiently antecedent date to have been noticed.
28. J.D. Constr. Corp. v. lsaacs, 51 N.J. 263, 239 A.2d 657 (1968), holding that the
question had been raised prematurely. On the general problem, see Garcia v. Hilton Hotels Int'l,
97 F. Supp. 5 (D.P.R. 1951); Magelo v. Roundup Coal Min. Co., 109 Mont. 293, 96 P.2d 932
(1939); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Adams, 196 Okla. 597, 168 P.2d 105 (1946); Aransas
Harbor Term. Ry. Co. v. Taber, 235 S.W. 841 (I'ex. Com. App. 1921).
29. See Merrill, Standards-A Sajeguard For the Exercise of Delegated Power, 47 NED.
L. REv. 469, 473-79 (1968).
30. Id. at 479-91.
[VOL. 22
LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
imprecise words, aided by analogous statutes; (6) imprecise words,
made specific by administrative action; (7) imprecise words used in
connection with national preservation-war power and foreign
relations. Of course, local administrative bodies should not be
involved with the last category. As to the others, however, the recent
decisions seem to present significant examples of the exercise and the
application to the parochial tribunals of the general characteristics
outlined above.
As a general rule, the exercise of general legislative power, even
of a localized character, is not required to be subject to standards 1
The obvious reason is that, in the American system of government,
general legislative power will be vested in elective bodies. We rely on
this selection, and in the legislator's recognition that the responsibility
for policy planning is in his hands, for safeguard against irresponsible
and abusive exercise of power. We must also recall that usually
general legislative policy, concerned with application to broad classes
of problems, is not fairly amenable to guidance through standards.
The constitutional need for standards extends equally to the
exercise of delegated adjudicative power 2 as to administrative rule-
making.3 3 The local governing body, acting in an administrative
capacity, may and must provide the standards for its own -guidance if
they have not been fixed by statute. Therefore, it may properly defer
action upon an application for exercise of its administrative
discretion, pending the provision of standards.34 Whatever their
31. Wilson v. Hidden Valley Mun. Water Dist., 63 Cal. Rptr. 889 (Ct. App. 1967); Gino's
of Maryland v. City of Baltimore, 250 Md. 621, 244 A.2d 218 (1968). See Blacker v. Wiethe, 16
Ohio St. 2d 65, 242 N.E.2d 655 (1968).
32. Walden v. Hart, 243 Ark. 650, 420 S.W.2d 868 (1967) (authorizattion to police chief
to authorize or designate "emergency vehicles"); State ex rel. Allen v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 214 So. 2d 7 (Fla. App. 1968) (disciplinary procedures); Waterville Hotel Corp. v.
Board of Zoning App., 241 A.2d 50 (Me. 1968) (major changes of use of land, buildings or
structures subject to approval of Board of Zoning Appeals); Tillberg v. Township of Kearny, 103
N.J. Super. 324, 247 A.2d 161 (1968) (licenses not to be issued without approval of chief of
police and town council); City of Tonawanda v. Tonawanda Theater Corp., 29 App. Div. 2d
217, 287 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1968) (all licenses to be procured from mayor at his discretion);
Lawrence v. Calin, 244 A.2d 570 (R.I. 1968) (removal of officer must rest on substantial
grounds).
33. Belleville Chamber of Commerce v. Town of Belleville, 51 N.J. 153, 238 A.2d 181
(1968) (vague standards for licensing rules); Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 52 N.J.
348, 245 A.2d 336 (1968) (rules as to requirement of off-site improvements by developer);
Novak v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 57 Misc. 2d 927, 293 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (applicant
for plumbers license shall have qualifications deemed necessary by plumbing board).
34. City of Coral Gables v. Sakolsky, 215 So. 2d 329 (Fla. App. 1968).
1969]
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source, the administrator is bound to follow the standard as
established
5
A recent decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court,3 otherwise
alert to the need for standards, seems to have overlooked a proper
occasion for their exercise. A city ordinance allowed a zoning board
to locate specified land uses in a district from which they otherwise
would be barred. Apparently, no guidelines were established for the
exercise of this discretion. The court held this extremely broad
provision adequate to allow the board to authorize an addition to an
existing nonconforming structure of a type for which the ordinance
would permit the establishment of a special use. Necessarily, this
decision assumed the proposition that, despite the absence of
guidelines, the original vesting of dispensing power was valid. It is
difficult to justify that result. The language of the ordinance does not
seem sufficiently limited to enable a court to divine where the line
should be drawn in order to meet the legislative policy, within the
third classification of standards recited above. Accordingly, one must
put the decision in his collection of unsound adjudications and rely on
other recent cases which have more accurately perceived the dangers
of extremely vague gnomology.37
B. Specific Standards
How have the courts policed the problems of delegation, viewed
in the light of the suggested classifications? Two recent decisions seem
to uphold precise directions, fitting the first category above.l A third
case which the court seemed to think involved the enforcement of
detailed commands, may be more dubious. The latter litigation was
over the refusal of New York City authorities to let the municipal
35. Ziomek v. Bartimole, 156 Conn. 604, 244 A.2d 380 (1968); RK Dev. Corp. v. City of
Norwalk, 156 Conn. 369, 242 A.2d 781 (1968); Shell Oil Co. v. Zoning Bd. of App., 156 Conn.
66, 238 A.2d 426 (1968); Dolan v. Zoning Bd. of App., 156 Conn. 426, 242 A.2d 713 (1968);
Rupp v. Lindsay, 57 Misc. 2d 946, 293 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Burke v. Zoning Bd. of
Rev., 238 A.2d 50 (R.I. 1968).
36. Williams v. Kueknert, 243 Ark. 746, 421 S.W.2d 896 (1967).
37. Walden v. Hhrt, 243 Ark. 650, 420 S.W.2d 868 (1967) (want of any guidance);
Waterville Hotel Corp. v. Board of Zoning App., 241 A.2d 50 (Me. 1968) ("public interest,"
"public health, safety and general welfare" too broad, as extending to the outer ambit of
legislative discretion); Battaglia v. Planning Bd., 98 N.J. Super. 194, 236 A.2d 608 (1967)
("other special requirements").
38. Brush v. Zoning Bd. of App., 57 Misc. 2d 751, 293 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sup. Ct. 1968)
(specific and detailed standards for off-street parking); State ex rel. Marshall v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 14 Ohio St. 2d 226, 237 N.E.2d 392 (1968) ("the guidelines governing what he may
do are detailed . . . and such actions as he may take are subject to review and control").
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stadium for the purpose of holding a rally for presidential candidate
George Wallace. The purposes for which the stadium might be let
were set forth thus:
.* . for any purpose or purposes which is of such a nature as to furnish to, or
foster or promote among, or provide for the benefit of, the people of the city,
recreation, entertainment, amusement, education, enlightenment, cultural
development or betterment, and improvement of trade and commerce, including
professional, amateur and scholastic sports and athletic events, theatrical,
musical or other entertainment presentations, and meetings, assemblages,
conventions and exhibitions for any purpose, including meetings, assemblages,
conventions and exhibitions held for busilhess or trade purposes, and other events
of civic, community and general public interest. . . . It is hereby declared that
all of the purposes referred to in this subdivision b are for the benefit of the
people of the city and for the improvement of their health, welfare, recreation,
and prosperity, for the promotion of competitive sports for youth and the
prevention of juvenile delinquency, and for the improvement of trade and
commerce, and are hereby declared to be public purposes 9
The court ruled that in "excluding partisan political activity, the
Commissioner has not acted in conformance with the standard
promulgated to guide his discretion. ' 40 I think that my reaction
would be the other way: that no meaningful standard had been
"promulgated to guide his discretion." The statute prescribed letting
for so many and such diverse objects that practically nothing was left
out. The so-called standard is disturbingly like that omnium-gatherum
which brought the National Industrial. Recovery Act to grief.4 In that
analysis, the act well might fall for intrusting the administrator with
too liberal a delegation. This rendition perhaps would have closed the
stadium to all but the specifically enumerated sports, theatrical and
business events. It would not have helped the promoters of the rally.
Probably the best justification of the decision is to invoke the well-
established principle of constitutional law that public places of
assemblage must be open to peaceably expressed propaganda of
whatever type 2 Such a rationale would have avoided the problem of
the definiteness of the standard by establishing the invalidity of the
exclusion, even had it been specific.
C. Legislative Purpose
Category two is represented by cases which sustain guidelines for
39. Rupp v. Lindsay, 57 Misc. 2d 946, 948-49, 293 N.Y.S.2d 812, 816 (Sup. Ct. 1968)
(emphasis added).
40. Id. at 949, 293 N.Y.S. 2d at 817.
41. See Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
42. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
1969]
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the removal of topsoil,4l 3 the establishment of setback requirements,44
the protection of a municipal sewer system,45 implementation of gun
control codes,4  excepted uses in zoning,47 the provision of sinks in
rental properties.48 In one instance, the somewhat imprecise statement
was confined within manageable bounds by resort to the canon of
ejusdem generis.49 In another instance, however, an invocation of a
preambulatory statement in the statute itself seems not to have been
permitted. 0 The decision seems unsound in that respect. If the
preamble served to make the statutory purpose adequately clear, that
should have sufficed; preambles are adequate aids for the
interpretation of statutes.51 Of course, if the matter in the statute is
not sufficiently clear to remove uncertainty, the attempted invocation
is fruitless. 2
D. Limited Subject Matter
The third category raises the problem of the judicial ability to
sense the legislative intent by reading the lawmakers' imprecise words
in the light of the limited subject of the act, thereby coming to the
conclusion that the meaning is clear.5 3 Several of the cases examined
seem to exemplify this principle.54 One ruling, however, that
43. Koslow v. Municipal Council, 52 N.J. 441, 245 A.2d 729 (1968).
44. Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y. 2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891 (1968) (avoid
or minimize traffic hazards, impairment of use, enjoyment or value of property in surrounding
areas, and deterioration of appearance of area).
45. Larsen Baking Co. v. City of New York, 30 App. Div. 2d 400, 292 N.Y.S.2d 145
(1968) (prevent discharge of harmful material into sewer system, protection of system and
treatment process).
46. Grimm v. City of New York, 56 Misc. 2d 525, 289 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
47. Jackson v. Board of Adjustment, 2 N.C. App. 408, 163 S.E.2d 265 (1968). This decision
is aided by the court's notion that public interest is a word of judicial art under Category Four,
and, more reasonably, by the fact that the standard was to be administratively implemented,
which bring's into play the sageguard involved in Category Six.
48. Westgate Hotel, Inc. v. Krumbiegel, 39 Wisc. 2d 108, 158 N.W.2d 362 (1968) (sink of
a size and design adequate for the purpose of washing eating and drinking utensils, located in a
kitchen properly connected with a cold water line and a hot water line).
49. Battaglia v. Planning Bd., 98 N.J. Super. 194, 236 A.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967).
50. Waterville Hotel Corp. v. Board of Zoning App. 241 A.2d 50 (Me. 1968).
51. Prewitt v. Warfield, 203 Ark. 137, 156 S.W. 2d 238 (1941).
52. Tillberg v. Township of Kearny, 103 N.J. Super. 324, 247 A.2d 161 (Law Div. 1968)
(no standards provided for grant of license; provision for revocation on grounds of due cause does
not remedy the defect).
53. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 482.
54. Nelson v. Board of Examiners, 21 N.Y.2d 408, 235 N.E.2d 433, 288 N.Y.S.2d 454
(1968) (constitutional provision that appointments and promotions "shall be made according to
merit and fitness, to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination, which, as far as
practicable, shall be competitive" held to authorize subjective type of test concerning practical
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"dilapidation" is too general a test for determining when a building
should be abated as a fire hazard or as a hazard to human life, safety,
health or public welfare,55 seems unwarrantably strict under this test.
Surely, any intelligent judge or administrator could determine when a
structure was so dilapidated as to pose a threat to the interests
named. In addition, the legislative intent to promote physical safety of
persons and property is clear. A combination of narrow subject and
administrative implementation (Category Six) clearly is advan-
tageous.5
In many cases, where the legislation contains no stated principle,
courts have been willing to resort to an unexpressed but clearly
apparent standard, based upon the narrowness and the obvious
purpose of the statute in order to save the delegation of power.5 7 The
Supreme Court of Alabama resorted to this tactic to save an
ordinance exacting permits for holding a parade or public
demonstration, apparently at the sole discretion of the authorities5 8
The Supreme Court of the United States recently reversed this
determination,59 referring to the Alabama action as "a remarkable job
of plastic surgery." The job was no more remarkable, however, than
some which the Court has sanctioned. 0 Probably, its decision is but
one more example of its growing impatience with broad terms which
lend themselves to encroachments upon liberty of expression in
various forms.6" I would regard it as something of a tragedy for our
constitutional law if this were to lead to an across-the-board
repudiation of the unexpressed-but-clearly-apparent-standard
technique.
abilities of teacher); Parolisi v. Board of Examiners, 55 Misc. 2d 546, 285 N.Y.S.2d 936
(Sup. Ct. 1967) (same provision held to authorize adoption of standards for health and physical
fitness of teachers, to the extent that they are relevant to performance of duty); Brush v. Zoning
Bd. of App., 57 Misc. 2d 751, 293 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (off-street parking
requirements, subject to approval of board); Tarver v. City Comm'n, 72 Wash. 2d 726, 435
P.2d 531 (1967) (in determining whether a taxi driver is "trustworthy," has a "good
reputation," and is "morally responsible" in a license revocation proceeding, evidence will be
confined to facts bearing relevance to fitness for occupation).
55. City of Saginaw v. Budd, 381 Mich. 173, 160 N.W.2d 906 (1968).
56. Forest Constr. Co. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 155 Conn. 669, 236 A.2d 917
(1967).
57. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 482-86.
58. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 281 Ala. 542, 206 So. 2d 348 (1967).
59. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 89 S. Ct. 935 (1969).
60. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923); New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr,
199 U.S. 552 (1905); Crowley v. Christenson, 137 U.S. 86 (1890).
61. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 486.
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E. Legally Significant Words
Category Four embraces those cases wherein imprecise words,
through long continued use, have acquired so established a meaning in
legalese that the judges, feeling perfectly at home with them, are
willing to permit their use as standards. "Cause" or "good cause" as
a ground for discharging or otherwise disciplining a public employee
is such a term. The judges feel that they can confine its application to
causes bearing some reasonable relation to fitness for the employment,
thereby eliminating or reducing the chance of oppressive use of the
disciplinary procedure. 2 "Public interest" appears to have been given
a somewhat similar role in one case 3 Factors which would place the
ordinance in harmony with categories two and four as well were
present, and the decision properly seems attributable to the combined
safeguards. Otherwise, "public interest," standing alone, smacks too
much of the broad policy choices available only to those possessed of
general legislative power to be acceptable as a guide for
administrators. 4 In this connection, note a recent and interesting
interpretation narrowing the broad concept of "immorality," as a
ground for the discharge of a school teacher, to such immoral
conduct as is inimical to the welfare of the school community as
distinguished from private acts or expressions. 5 This represents an
additional refinement, reducing the possibility of oppression from the
employment of words imprecise in popular context, although they
may have a long history of practical employment in judicial decision.
F. Analogous Statutes
The fifth category involves resort to analogous statutory
provisions to aid the search for legislative intent in the administration
of imprecise words. It assumes, of course, that our lawmakers carry
in mind what they have done before in the field. This assumption is
not unreasonable. It embodies the practice of careful draftsmen, if not
the habit of legislators as a body. Of course, the rejoinder may be
62. Coursey v. Board of Fire and Police Comm'rs, 90 Ill. App. 2d 31, 234 N.E.2d 339
(1967); Senese v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 88 Ill. App. 2d 172, 232 N.E.2d 256 (1967); Hale v.
Board of Educ., 13 Ohio St. 2d 92, 234 N.E.2d 583 (1968).
63. Jackson v. Board of Adjustment, 2 N.C. App. 408, 163 S.E.2d 265 (1968).
64. State ex rel Makris v. Superior Court, 113 Wash. 296, 193 P. 845 (1920).
65. Jarvella v. Board of Educ.,12 Ohio Misc. 288, 233 N.E.2d 143 (C.P. 1967). As a
horrible example of undue judicial latitudinarianism, compare the extension of the concept of
immorality to embrace political activity by school teachers, when directed against the
superintendent and the school board, in Watts v. Seward School Bd., 395 P.2d 372 (Alaska
1964).
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that a really careful draftsman would express specifically what he
intended to bring over from the past. But the pressures of composition
being what they are, all authors, at times, fall into the error of
assuming that their basic assumptions will be clear to those who read
their product. Consequently, I think that judicial resort to analogous
legislation to furnish a clue to necessary standards is justifiable.
For the period under examination, only two cases, even remotely,
are referable to this category. The first resorted to an authorized
requirement of the state health department to assist in fleshing out the
standard of undue hardship as a basis for the grant of a zoning
variance.6 The other referred to provisions of state and city plumbing
codes to sustain a standard for the approval of kitchen sinks which
the court already had declared sufficient. 7 The particularistic nature
of local legislation, which rarely meshes with other enactments, at least
at the regional level, may account for the paucity of examples of
category five.
G. Specific Administrative Action
The sixth category involves the necessary particularization of
legislative imprecision through administrative application, subject to
various procedural safeguards which protect against adventurism and
free wheeling." Recent decisions concerning local administrative
agencies afford examples of the application of this category to such
standards as "the efficiency of the [police] service;" 9 "undue" or
"unnecessary" hardships as a basis for relaxation of zoning
restrictions;" "public necessity,"'" "public convenience and
welfare,"7 2 or "public interest '7 3 With respect to zoning relaxation;
"cause" as a basis for disciplinary proceedings against a public
employee.74
66. Williams v. Kueknert, 243 Ark. 746, 421 S.W.2d 896 (1967).
67. Westgate Hotel, Inc.v. Krumbiegel, 39 Wisc. 2d 108, 158 N.W.2d 362 (1968).
68. For more detailed discussion of the use and nature of this category, see Merrill, supra
note 29, at 487-89.
69. O;Bryant v. Theobald, 421 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1967).
70. Rosedale-Skinker Impr. Ass'n v. Board of Adjustment, 425 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1968);
Beerman v. City of Kettering, affd on technical grounds. 13 Ohio St. 2d 149, 235 N.E.2d 23 f
(1968).
71. Pioneer Trust and Say. Bank v. County of McHenry, 89 I11. 2d 257, 232 N.E.2d 816
(1967), rev'don other grounds, 101 111. App.2d 230, 241 N.E.2d 454 (1968).
72. Nani v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 242 A.2d 403 (R.I. 1968).
73. Jackson v. Board of Adjustment, 2 N.C. App. 408, 163 S.E.2d 265 (1968).
74. Coursey v. Board of Fire and Police Comm'rs, 90 111. App. 2d 31, 234 N.E.2d 339
(1967).
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For all its utility, caution should be urged in reliance on this type
of analysis to get over the problem of legislative abdication in the
vesting of delegated powers. For one thing, it may be ineffective
against the overriding concern of courts to' prevent undue restraint
upon liberty of portrayal of thought, even in the somewhat unlikely
guise of the movies 5 Also, the more general the terms employed, the
more arduous and less satisfactory is the judicial supervision which
forms the real effectiveness of the application of this doctrine of
standards. Professor Davis, it will be recalled, considers the
procedural safeguard element as the real source of protection against
administrative arbitrariness.76 But procedural safeguards can be applied
effectively only as there is some objective with reference to which the
procedure is to be exercised. An overly vague objective makes for
either the evolution of rules of thumb in judicial administration or for
whimsical diversity in result. The typical zoning ordinances, with their
prescription of "practical difficulty" and of "hardship," variously
described, furnish us with examples in plenty. On the one hand, there
is the tendency to evolve rules of thumb, such as that the hardship
cannot be seif-imposed;77 that the inability to make as much money as
one would like is no hardship;78 that the hardship must be related to
the physical characteristics of the land;79 or the New York notion that
it is a "hardship" if the owner is not free to gain as much as he can,
without restraint for the public good.!' On the other hand, these loose
provisions may provoke extended debate!' One also finds cases in
which, apparently, the reviewing court sustains 2 or reverses8 3 the
decisions of the zoning authorities as the merits of the particular
75. Burton v. Municipal Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 721, 441 P.2d 281 (Cal. 1968).
76. See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 106, 111, 148, 149, 151 (1958).
77. Sherman v. Gustafson, 28 App. Div. 2d 1082, 285 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1967); Stratford
Arms, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 429 Pa. 132, 239 A.2d 325 (1968).
78. Shell Oil Co. v. Zoning Bd. of App., 156 Conn. 66, 238 A.2d 426 (1968); Helfrich v.
Mongelli, 248 Md. 498, 237 A.2d 454 (1968).
79. Isko v. Planning Bd., 5I N.J. 162, 238 A.2d 457 (1968).
80. Jayne Estates, Inc. v. Raynor, 22 N.Y.2d 417, 239 N.E.2d 713, 293 N.Y.S.2d 75
(1968); cf. Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. County of McHenry, 41 111. 2d 77, 241 N.E.2d 454
(1968).
81. Compare Pioneer Trust and Say. Bank v. County of McHenry, 89 I. App. 2d 257,
232 N.E.2d 816 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 101 Ill. App. 2d 230, 241 N.E.2d 454 (1968),
with Nani v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 242 A.2d 403 (R.1. 1968).
82. Rosedale-Skinker Impr. Ass'n v. Board of Adjustment, 425 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1968);
Fiore v. Zoning Bd. of App., 21 N.Y.2d 393, 235 N.E.2d 121, 288 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1968).
83. Burke v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 238 A.2d 50 (R.I. 1968); Tidewater Util. Corp. v. City
of Norfolk, 208 Va. 705, 160 S.E.2d 799 (1968).
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situation appeal to it.s4 An outstanling example is a New Jersey
Supreme Court decision that a variance should be granted unless a
binding offer has been made to the owner to buy the lot from him at
its fair market value, not less than a specified amount.8s How this
result can be- harmonized with the concept of the administration of
justice according to law is a task which I do not attempt to perform.
Other cases, however, discuss the impropriety of such substitution of
the reviewing court's judgment for that of the agency reviewed.86
IV. INVESTIGATIVE, GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND RULE MAKING
AUTHORITY
A variety of decisions fall within the rubric of investigative,
general administrative, and rule making authority. For example, a
Massachusetts decision sustained the authority of a city finance
commission to investigate the conduct of the financial affairs of the
city. 7 Another case, dealing with the performance of executive
functions, adjudged that a notice that a probationary appointment
would not be made permanent was given in the proper manner 8 A
third example, from Connecticut, emphasized that an executive
function, such as the administration of an examination entrusted to a
board, must be performed by that body.9 The principle, of course,
applies to all collegiately organized agencies." Most of the current
case law in this grouping however, treats of the delegated power to
prescribe norms of conduct or, in other words, that which we term
rule making.
Obviously, when this power exists, it usually will be vested in a
body designated by appropriate statute or ordinance-a body which
may initiate action on its own motion. The established custom of the
country;" in addition to the constitutionally guaranteed right of
petition, permits any citizen to invoke the exercise of this authority.
84. Beerman v. City of Kettering, 14 Ohio. Misc. 144, 237 N.E.2d 641 (C.P. 1965), in
which the court held the administrative agency's denial of a permit not to be unreasonable and
then held that the denial of a variance for the same purpose was not supported by the
preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence.
85. Gougeon v. Board of Adjustment, 52 N.J. 212, 245 A.2d 7 (1968).
86. Eschinger v. Bus, 250 Md. 112, 242 A.2d 502 (1968); Paramore v. Brown, 448 P.2d
699 (Nev. 1968).
87. Finance Comm'n v. Basile, 236 N.E.2d 520 (Mass. 1968).
88. Balsinger v. Borough of Zelienopole, 429 Pa. 355, 240 A.2d 807 (1968).
89. Ziomek v. Bartimole, 156 Conn. 604, 244 A.2d 380 (1968).
90. School Dist. No. 39 v. Shelton, 26 Okla. 229, 109 P. 67 (1910); Nason v. Directors of
Poor, 126 Pa. 445, 17 A. 616 (1889).
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Statutes frequently so provide. However, the right should not be used
with vexatious repetition, as 'a recent decision attests.'
If a quorum is available, absent express legislative command,
vacancies in the membership of the rule making body do not impair
its ability to act. 2 If the agency has both rule making and executive
powers, the former may be exercised only in open legislative session,
rather than in an executive meeting. 3
By its very nature, and certainly in the absence of express
statutory provision, a "rule" must be formulated in writing."
Obviously, rules must yield to a higher law; thus a rule made by a
local agency is subordinate to a lawfully promulgated rule of a
superior state agency.
95
Rule making procedure frequently is prescribed by statute." A
common requirement is opportunity for a public hearing with due
notice.17 Notice is sufficient if it reasonably apprises the public of the
action proposed; detailed description is unnecessary."' A meeting duly
announced in a notice for a specified time and place is not invalidated
by publicly announced recess to a more commodious, nearby hall,
necessary to accommodate the crowd in attendance.9
In accordance with the norms of the general administrative
law,109 a local agency rule-making hearing, unless governing statutes
specifically so command,01 is not adversary in character and need not
be marked by formalities of evidential presentation and rebuttal.02
91. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, Inc. v. Parent Teachers Ass'n, 443 P.2d 608 (Nev.
1968). On rehearing, this decision was overruled, 451 P.2d 713 (Nev. 1969). The result is
sound analytically, but regretable practically.
92. Smith v. City of Fort Dodge, 160 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1968).
93. Scull v. Citizens League, 249 Md. 271, 239 A.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1968).
94. People v. Fisher, 56 Misc. 2d 1021, 290 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Justice Ct. 1968).
95. Board of Supervisors v. State Dep't of Social Servs., 58 Misc. 2d 45, 294 N.Y.S.2d
734 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
96. The meaning of statute, as used here, may include municipal ordinance. Sibarco Sta-
tions, Inc. v. Town Bd., 29 App. Div. 2d 907, 288 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1968).
97. When a prescription is applicable only for "major" changes, a nice question of
statutory construction is raised. See Smith v. City of Fort Dodge, 160 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1968).
98. Dupont v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 156 Conn. 213, 240 A.2d 899 (1968); Passero
v. Zoning Comm'n, 155 Conn. 511, 235 A.2d 660 (1967); Blackburn v. Norman Estates, Inc.,
232 N.E.2d 442 (Ohio C.P. 1967).
99. Dupont v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 156 Conn. 213, 240 A.2d 899 (1968).
100. E.g.. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Ct., 36 Cal. 2d 538, 225 P.2d 905 (1950);
Montgomery County v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 203 Md. 79, 98 A.2d 15 (Ct. App. 1953); H.F.
Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 162 Okla. 89, 19 P.2d 347.
101. Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949).
102. County of Nassau v.'Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 57 Misc. 2d 1025, 293
N.Y.S.2d 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Desloge v. County of St. Louis, 431 S.W. 2d 126 (Mo. 1968).
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Delaware, as to zoning rules, seems to rule contrariwise.1 13 In any
event, the person complaining of defects in the hearing should be
required to point out wherein he has been harmed.0 4
Concordantly with the great weight of authority,10' the analogy to
legislation makes inapplicable to a rule making proceeding, even at
the local level, the constitutional concept that due process of law
vitiates proceedings before a tribunal on which a biased or financially
interested party sits.'
Again in analogy to legislation, there probably is no time limit
on the response of a rule making authority to a petition for action. It
is possible that something could be done to rectify an inordinate delay
on the established principle that mandamus may be used to compel
the exercise of jurisdiction, but the complainant must be able to show
that more than a reasonable time within which action should have
been taken has elapsed.107
Once promulgated, the principle that all persons are charged with
notice of legislative enactments is applied to administrative rules.0 8




A. The Right to a Hearing
The established constitutional principle that due process of law
requires that a hearing be given, upon adequate notice, before interests
of life, liberty, or propertyare infringed upon by administrative
103. Allen v. Donovan, 239 A.2d 227 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1968); Daniel D. Rappa, Inc. v.
Hanson, 42 Del. Ch. 273, 209 A.2d 163 (Sup. Ct. 1965). The origin of the doctrine seems to rest
in dicta, Shellburne, Inc. v. Roberts, 224 A.2d 250 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1966); McQuail v. Shell Oil
Co., 40 Del. Ch. 396, 183 A.2d 572 (1962).
104. Desloge v. County of St. Louis, 431 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. 1968).
105. Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Bd., 134 Fla. 1, 183 So. 759
(1938); Downs v. Mayor & Common Council, 116 N.J.L. 511, 185 A. 15 (Err. & App. 1936);
Sparks v. State, 72 Okla. Cr. 283, 115 P.2d 277 (Ct. Cr. App. 1941); cf. Blankenship v. City of
Richmond, 188 Va. 97, 49 S.E.2d 321 (1948). Compare Johnson v. Michigan Milk Marketing Bd.,
295 Mich. 644, 295 N.W., 346 (1940); People v. Murphy, 364 Mich. 363, 110 N.W.2d 805
(1961).
106. County of Nassau v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 57 Misc. 2d 1025, 293 N.Y.S,2d
1017 (Sup. Ct. 1968).Of course, this principle applies to the enactment of ordinances by a
municipal legislature. City of Miami Beach v. Schauer, 104 So.2d 129 (D. Ct. App. Fla.
1958).
107. City of Coral Gables v. Sakolsky, 215 So.2d 329 (D. Ct.App. Fla. 1968).
108. See 3 M. MERRILL, NOTICE § 1118 (1952).
109. Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 21 Ala. App. 5, 105 So. 161, cert.
denied, 213 Ala. 413, 105 So. 168 (1925).
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adjudicatory action applies to local tribunals quite as much as to
those of national or statewide jurisdiction. There are certain
exceptions, of course, such as the need for prompt action to safeguard
such important interests as the public health, safety, security or
welfare. The most recent decisions on such agencies, however, have
recognized less defensible exemptions, such as that an officer having
no guaranty of tenure may be fired summarily"0 or that some
disreputable occupations lie outside the pale of due process."' Of
course, the right to hearing may be granted expressly by statute,"'
affording a basis for the nullity of the proceedings if it is denied."'
Hearing may be waived at the election of the respondent; waiver
may be signified by a failure to demand it within a fixed time after
notification of the proposed action is given,"' and there is authority
that a concession of the existence of the conditions justifying the order
that was entered has a similar effect." 5 A purported action without
hearing is cured by a hearing accorded in fact before the action is
made final."' Applicable statutes"' and the jurisdictional ordinances
of the municipality"' itself must be followed faithfully in determining
the basis for hearings to which these enactmentg apply. The
respondent may terminate the hearing by a dismissal; the voluntary
resignation of a public employee by agreement in settlement of a
proceeding for his removal is such a termination."' The repeal of an
ordinance under which an administrative proceeding was commenced
terminates the proceeding, in the absence of a savings clause.' 0
110. Ocean-Hill-Brownsville Governing Bd. v. Board of Educ., 30 App. Diy. 2d 447, 294
N.Y.S.2d 134 (1968).I1. Barlotta v. Jefferson Parish Council, 212 So. 2d 220 (La. App. 1968). For a critique
of this heresy, from another viewpoint, see M. MERRILL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 56 (1954).
112. City of New Haven v. Le Fever, 238 N.E.2d 487 (Ind. App. 1968) (removal of
officer); J.D. Constr. Corp. v. Isaacs, 51 N.J. 263, 239 A.2d 657 (1968).
113. State ex rel. Linger v. Board of Educ., 163 S.E 12d 790 (W. Va. 1968) (right to
hearing implied from teachers's right to notice of recommended assignment).
114. Beckwith v. School Administrative Dist. No. 2, 243 A.2d 62 (Me. 1968).
115. Newbury Disposal, Inc. v. Newbury Tp. Trustees, 15 Ohio St. 2d 113, 238 N.E.2d
779 (1968).
116. Snider v. School Dist. R-1, 442 P.2d 429 (Colo. 1968).
117. Finn v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 156 Conn, 540, 244 A.2d 391 (1968); City of
New Haven v. Le Fever, 238 N.E.2d 487, (Ind. App. 1968); Verrill v. Daley, 126 Vt. 444, 236
A.2d 238 (1967).
118. See Fitzgerald v. Salt Lake County, 449 P.2d 653 (Utah 1969).
119. Cedar v. Commissioner of Educ., 30 App. Div. 2d 882, 291 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1968).




The concept of due process requires notice to the party to be
affected by-administrative adjudication. Normally, this notice
accomplishes two purposes: it notifies the respondent that proceedings
have been brought which he should defend;121 and it gives him
information concerning the issues that are tendered as the basis for
the claimed relief. 2  Charges not specified12 3 or not adequately
indicated' 24 cannot be made the basis for a determination. However,
allowance of time for adequate defense will cure deficiencies in the
charge.'25
Service of the notice obviously is essential to the proper
performance of both its functions. If governing law is silent, the
inference is that it must be personal-formally brought to the
respondent in some way. 28 However, by statute, a variety of substitutes
may be employed. 27 The constitutional touchstone, as to all, is tifat,
where interests of life, liberty or property are at stake, the method
that, under the circumstances, offers the best chance of reaching the
noticee be employed. 2 8 The reports examined in the preparation, of
this article reveal but one decision touching on the subject, and that
decision merely sustained the propriety of use of a Sunday newspaper
to satisfy a statutory direction for published notice not containing a
specification respecting a particular day of the week. 29 One would
expect to see the courts continue their custom of applying to local
tribunals the same requirements that they impose upon agencies of
more generalized jurisdiction, ince there seems to be nothing either in
the more restricted competence or in the more limited resources of the
121. Will v. City of Herington, 201 Kan. 627, 443 P.2d 667 (1968); J.D. Constr. Corp. v.
Isaacs, 51 N. J. 263, 239 A.2d 657 (1968).
122. City of New Haven v. LeFever, 238 N.E.2d 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968); Will v. City of
Herington, 201 Kan. 627, 443 P.2d 667 (1968); Glenn v. Board of County Comm'rs, 440 P.2d I
(Wyo. 1968) (under model state administrative procedure act).
123. Nordstrom v. Haniford, 435 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1967).
124. Melikian v. Berman, 58 Misc. 2d 178, 294 N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
125. Cf. Civil Serv. Bd. v. Page, 2 N.C. App. 34, 162 S.E.2d 644 (1968). A
characterization of an act, by a witness, is not the interjection of a new charge based on the
characterization, where all the agency action is directed at the original charge. Bennett v. Price,
446 P.2d 419 (Colo. 1968).
126. For a general review, see I M. MERRILL, NOTICE §§ 600-26 (1952).
127. For discussion, see I & 2 M. MERRILL,' NOTICE §§ 627-44 (mail) 645-93
(publication) 694-713 (posting) (1952).
128. The basic decision for modern law is Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950), dealing with process, not notice, but the principle is the same.
129. Oeth v. Felty, 421 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1967).
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local administrators to call for modification. Finally, it should be
observed that statutes sometimes require notice to persons who might
not come within the range of constitutional entitlement thereto .
3 0
With respect to the second function of the notice in disciplinary
proceedings-information as to the nature of the issues to be
presented-the charges should be specific as to essentials . 3, However,
such minor faults as including an accusation of "general inefficiency"
along with specifications of particular defaults whereon the hearing
centered132 or making a multiplicity of irrelevant charges,""3 are
harmless. One holding that rejects "stale" charges of misconduct
probably is attributable to the court's belief that, in the particular
instance, persecution rather than prosecution was involved.,3
C. The Nature of the Hearing
Statutory provisions often determine who shall institute
proceedings.. The two decisions on this topic relating to local agencies
stand for liberality in the construction and application of these
provisions.1 35 Concerning the general source of procedural
requirements, however, one court has evinced a rather technical
attitude in holding that a statute governing revocation of a license
does not cover the action of the agency in declining to renew a license
for the conduct of an established business. 3
The nature of the hearing to be accorded is governed by the
nature of the proceedings. Even in actions essentially adjudicative, the
130. J.D. Constr. Corp. v. Isaacs, 51 N.J. 263, 239 A.2d 657 (1968), affords one example
of the enforcement of such a requirement. In Jeffrey v. Platting Bd. of Rev., 239 A.2d 731 (R.I.
1968), the court denied the necessity of notification of a hearing on the sufficiency of a plat, as
to persons not specified in the statute.
131. State Tenure Comm'n v. Board of Educ., 282 Ala. 658, 213 So. 2d 823 (1968); City
of San Antonio v. Poulos, 422 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1967). The respondent's clearly apparent
understanding of the charges ributs his claim of vagueness and ambiguity in form. O'Bryant v.
Theobald, 421 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1967).
132. McCallister v. Priest, 422 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).
133. Lantini v. Daniels, 247 A.2d 298 (R.I. 1968).
.134. State Tenure Comm'n v. Board of Educ., 282 Ala. 658, 213 So. 2d 823 (1968).
135. Fleming v. Myers, 15 Ohio Misc. 205, 240 N.E.2d 511 (C.P. 1968) (county
commissioners, as superior officers over department of welfare, could initiate proceedings to
dismiss an employee for cause, although statute places county director of welfare in "full
charge" of the department); Hooper v. Goldstein, 241 A.2d 809 (R.I. 1968) (minor variation in
procedure).
136. State ex rel. Ruffalo v. Common Council, 38 Wis. 2d 518, 157 N.W.2d 568 (1968).
But cf. Walker v. City of Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 59 N.W.2d 785 (1953); Gilchrist v. Bierring,
234 Iowa 899, 14 N.W.2d 724 (1944).
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whole panoply of a trial-type hearing is not always demanded.1 37 In
quite a number of the cases examined on this proposition, the courts
were content to avoid analysis by unsatisfactorily and arbitrarily
characterizing the proceedings as "legislative" or "quasi-legislative."'
38
In most of these cases it seemed that the task performed by the
agency was essentially adjudicative in the sense that it involved
application of legal norms to the interests of individuals. The true
teaching of these decisions, it seems to me, is that the nature of
adjudication may be adapted to the object of the investigation and the
objectives to be accomplished, with "[d]ue regard to the nature of the
proceeding and the individual right affected by it.' '13  For some, an
informal consultation ma€ be adequate. 40 In others, more formality
may be necessary, yet the hearing still may be of the town meeting,
informal discussion, question and answer type, without formal posing
of issues, presentation of evidence and like accoutrements of judicial-
type hearings.' In others, legislative history and statutory language
may combine to compel a more searching trial-type hearing than, at
first blush, the nature of the investigation might appear to entail.
4 2
Obviously, express statutory direction as to procedure must be
heeded.13 If the laws permit the agency to formulate procedural rules
137. United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953) (exigencies of raising armed forces may
modify nature of hearing given on classification of registrants); Madora v. Board of Educ., 386
F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967) (pupil suspension; representation by counsel).
138. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn. 521, 245 A.2d 579 (1968) (determination to take
property by eminent domain and to fix damages); Chevy Chase Village v. Board of App., 249
Md. 334, 239 A.2d 740 (1968) (dictum, as to application for building permit); State ex rel.
Ruffalo v. Common Council, 38 Wis. 2d 518, 157 N.W.2d 568 (1968) (grant of liquor
license; testimony under oath, cross examination). In one case holding that adversary
trial-type incidents, such as cross-examination of witnesses, inspection of documents, and
presentation of evidence on one's own part, along with disclosure of basis on which action is
taken, are not required in subdivision plan approval, the court justified its position on the
ground that the action was neither legislative, judicial nor quasi-judicial. Forest Constr. Co. v.
Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 155 Conn. 669, 236 A.2d 917 (1967).
139. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn. 521, 245 A.2d 579 (1968).
140. Madora v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967) (suspension of school
student); Municipal Housing Auth. v. Meade, 58 Misc. 2d 25, 294 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Yonkers City
Ct. 1968) (public housing authority's notice of reasons for seeking tenant's eviction and latter's
opportunity for reply).
141. Forest Constr. Co. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 155 Conn. 669, 236 A.2d 917
(1967); Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn. 521, 245 A.2d 579 (1968); Chevy Chase Village v. Board of
App., 249 Md. 334, 239 A.2d 740 (1968).
- 142. Jeffersonville Redev. Comm'n y'. City of Jeffersonville, 229 N.E.2d 825 (Ind. 1967),
cited with approval, Derloshon v. City of F~ort Wayne, 234 N.E.2d 269 (Ind. 1968).
143. Murphy v. Police Bd., 94 III. App. 2d 153, 236 N.E.2d 344 (1968) (foreign decisions
under differently worded statutes have little authority in applying local statutes; amendment
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
of its own, the rules must be observed 44 unless it has also been
accorded permission to waive them. 45 Generally the view is that
adjudication may proceed "with all deliberate speed," but if a statute
specifies the period wherein decision must be achieved, the agency
may not extend this limit by the device of creating preliminary
applications of a sort unknown to the enactment.'
Parties to a proceeding must have the necessary standing.'47
Under some zoning statutes, standing is achieved by filing a written
protest against action under consideration.' The equivalent of a
special appearance has been recognized without specific statutory
command. When a building inspector erroneously ruled that a special
permit was necessary for certain construction the court held that
application for the permit did not waive the question of the
applicant's right to operate without a permit.'49 Also, without
enactment, and solely as the consequence of its authorization to hear,
an agency may consider interdependent proposals together, though it
may act separately upon them.5 0
D. Conditions which Disqualify an Administrator
In general, one of the more troublesome problems of administrative
law arises out of the due process requirement in proceedings involving
interests of liberty or property that adjudicators must not be
prejudiced by conditions so destructive of their impartiality as to
permitting hearing to be conducted by one member of board is procedural and applies to validate
such a hearing in a pending proceeding); Rotenberry v. Renfro, 214 So: 2d 275 (Miss. 1968)
(separation of issues required- by statute); Isko v. Planning Bd. 51 N.J. 162, 238 A.2d 457 (1968)
(necessary recommendations, preliminary to adjudication, must be made); Nichol v. Planning
Bd., 28 App. Div. 2d 1077, 285 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1967) (prescribed information on application for
building permit; lack vitiates effect of application); Sheldon v. Stabile, 57 Misc. 2d 407, 293
N.Y.S.2d 3 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (removal proceedings must comply with law). Delay and silence,
while action is taken in reliance on administratiye decision, may estop one from seeking a
rehearing in reliance on a procedural defect. Oeth v. Felty, 421 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1967).
144. Williams v. Mayor& Bd. of Aldermen, 118 Ga. App. 271, 163 S.E.2d 239 (1968).
145. Garner v. Lumberton Independent School Dist., 430 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968). A rule made obsolete by statutory change loses binding quality even though not formally
repealed or waived. Nelson v. Board of Examiners, 21 N.Y.2d 408, 235 N.E.2d 433 (1968),
following. Goldberg v. Board of Examiners, 28 App. Div. 2d 533, 279 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1967).
146. Finn v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 156 Conn. 540, 244 A.2d 391 (1968).
147. Packham v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 238 A.2d 387 (R.I. 1968) (necessity that applicant
for zoning exception have some right, title or interest in land).
148. Baxter v. Board of App., 248 Md. 11I, 235 A.2d 536 (1967).
149. Colonial Sand & Stone Co. v. Johnston, 20 N.Y.2d 964, 233 N.E.2d 858, 286
N.Y.S.2d 855 (1967).
150. Norris v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 156 Conn. 592, 244 A.2d 378 (1968).
[VOL. 22
LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
prevent a fair hearing. The matter is rarely covered in state
administrative procedural acts, and both versions of the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act omit any reference thereto. As a
result, courts are confronted with the necessity of developing, with no
more specific guideline than the concept of due process, not only the
definition of a disqualifying condition, but also the remedy which can
be afforded when one faces or has faced a disqualified
administrator. 15
1
Obviously, as to the problem of the disqualified administrator at
the local agency level, in view of. the sketchy form of most of the
legal framework under which local agencies operate, the odds are
against the existence of much in the way of statutory guidelines. This
assumption is confirmed by a number of recent cases touching upon
the problem area in one form or another. In few cases was a statute
of any aid in arriving at a solution.
The first problem is defining the grounds of disqualification. If
the statute prescribes a qualification or a manner of appointment, and
it is disobeyed, the case is simple. The improperly designated
adjudicator is disqualified and the hearing conducted by him, or by a
college of which he is a necessary member, is vitiated.112 In one case,
however, harmless error was invoked to save the decision where the
respondent had expressly agreed to proceed before the tribunal and the
basic facts were not in dispute.53 In a few other instances, statutory
grounds of disqualification existed in terms applicable to the local
tribunals involved.'54 This is not true if, as is frequently the case, the
agency, or some member thereof, is asked to make a preliminary
investigation to determine whether, prima facie, enough factual
foundation exists so that a proceeding should be instituted. This
preliminary investigation and tentative conclusion is not a
circumstance compelling disqualification. 5 5  Similarly, a prior
151. See Merrill, Oklahoma's New Administrative Procedure Act, 17 OKLA. L. REV. 1,
33 (1964), for a discussion of the general situation. Note FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.09 (Supp.
1969) which does contain a procedure that can be made applicable to local agencies. State ex
rel. Allen v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 214 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968).
152. Nordstrom v. Hansford, 435 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1968).
153. Independent School Dist. No. 316 v. Eckert, 161 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 1968).
154. RK Corp. v. City of Norwalk, 242 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1968) (city commission acted in
capacity which court held to be same as planning commission; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-21
(1966) (forbade member of planning commission to be interested directly or indirectly in matter
before commission); State ex rel. Allen v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 214 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1968).,
155. Fleming v. Myers, 15 Ohio Misc. 205, 240 N.E.2d 511 (C.P. 1968); Jarvella v.
Board of Educ., 12 Ohio Misc. 288, 233 N.E.2d 143 (C.P. 1967); cf. Wilson v. Municipal Water
Dist., 63 Cal. Rptr: 889 (Ct. App. 1968).
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acquaintance with some facets of the matter to be decided, not
bearing on the point at issue, does not disqualify the adjudicator.'
The rule typically is stated that an interest which will disqualify
an adjudicator must be a direct, personal, pecuniary interest.'57 By
statute, at least, the interest may be an indirect interest through one's
spouse. 5 8 Close relationship to a party or counsel in the matter
disqualifies an adjudicator without need of statute;55 indeed, one case,
in effect, applied this principle when a member of the tribunal's
appointing authority appeared before the tribunal on behalf of a
relative and other parties.'
The possession of "vital information" bearing specifically upon
the issues by a hearing officer who refused either to disqualify or to
give testimony in the matter has been held to vitiate the proceeding.",
This decision is also probably related to the rule forbidding adjudication
to rest upon the tribunal's personal knowledge, not made a part of the
record, although the court may have regarded such conduct as an
indication that the officer had prejudged the issues.
The second problem of disqualification is the nature of available
remedies. Ideally, there should be a regularized procedure created by
statute, whereby the claimed disqualification could be raised as soon
as it was discovered. Such procedure is rare, however, even among
statewide agencies, and it is almost unknown in respect to local
agencies. In Florida, a statute has been given application to county
boards of education, but only on the theory that they are state
agencies.6 2 The statutory language seems broad enough to include
municipal agencies, but the court did not rest its decision on that
basis. In Connecticut, there is a specific remedy provision limited to
zoning mattersY.3 In the absence of a statutory remedy no recourse is
available unless participation of the disqualified official is held to
vitiate the determination.'64 Of course, in the absence of statute
156. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn. 521, 245 A.2d 579 (1968); Atherton v. City of Concord,
245 A.2d 387 (N.H. 1968).
157. E.g., Atherton v. City of Concord, 245 A.2d 387 (N.H. 1968).
158. RK Dev. Corp. v. City of Norwalk, 156 Conn. 369, 242 A.2d 781 (1968).
159. Kremer v. City of Plainfield, 101 N.J. Super. 346, 244 A.2d 335 (1968). The court
relies heavily on the duty resting specifically on judges, by statute and by rule of court.
160. Baiky v. Nick, II Mich. App. 381, 161 N.W.2d 445 (1968).
161. Cross v. Pearsall, 29 App. Div. 2d 553, 286 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1967).
162. State ex rel. Allen v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 214 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968).
163. Cf. RK Dev. Corp. v. City of Norwalk, 156 Conn. 369, 242 A.2d 781 (1968).
164. Id.; Barky v. Nick, II Mich. App. 381, 161 N.W.2d 445 (1968); Kremer v. City of
Plainfield, 101 N.J Super. 346, 244 A.2d 335 (1968); Cross v. Pearsall, 29 App. Div. 2d 553,
286 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1967).
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allowing the recusation of a member simply by filing an affidavit,
merely charging the existence of disqualification, without proof, will
not suffice to gain relief of any sort.'65 A spurious "rule of necessity,"
refusing to attach nullity if the officer's recusal would destroy the
tribunal, is now widely used, such as in a recent case denying an
attack on the grant of a special use permit to a corporation in which
members of the administrative board owned stock."6 At least one
other case seems to conflict with this view,' 7 and it would seem
preferable to hold invalid, as a denial of due process of law, a
statutory scheme that makes no adequate provision for
disqualification and replacement in such situations."' Where there is
an unperformed duty to recuse, a writ of prohibition against further
proceeding is an appropriate remedy."9
E. Conduct of the Hearing
Most general administrative procedure acts and a large proportion
of the statutes organizing admiinistrative bodies on a statewide basis
will contain more or less extensive provisions governing the conduct of
the hearing, once it gets under way. For reasons already explained,
however, there are few instances in which these aids are available in
respect to the local administrative agencies. Occasionally, a zoning
law or a governmental personnel statute will contain a provision
relating to the conduct of proceedings. For the most part, however,
the courts can only infer the rules from a grant of authority to decide,
or to conduct a hearing, supported by the ever-abiding foundation of
due process of law. Despite this general lack of procedural
specification, the courts seem to have little difficulty in policing the
conduct of hearings and in supervising their end products, the
administrative orders. The cases surveyed indicate that the results
reached do not depart greatly from the principles which govern the
conduct of the statewide agencies in the absence of specific statute.
The basic proposition, resting on the principle of due process, is
that the hearing must be fundamentally fair. 7 ' Occasionally, this
principle seems to be disparaged, as by a decision to "technically
construe" the requirement that one may not complain of the denial of
165. Jarvella v. Board of Educ., 12 Ohio Misc. 288, 233 N.E.2d 143 (C.P. 1967).
166. Gonsalves v. City of Dairy Valley, 71 Cal. Rptr. 255 (Ct. App. 1968).
167. Barky v. Nick, II Mich. App. 381, 161 N.W.2d 445 (1968).
168. See Merrill, supra note 151 at 34.
169. State ex rel. Allen v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 214 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968).
170. Hooper v. Goldstein, 241 A.2d 809 (R.l. 1968).
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a continuance unless he has placed in the record a formal and proper
motion seeking the extension.' Other courts have been liberal,
allowing adjustment for the size of the chambers wherein the contest
is to be heard and the number of attendants desiring to be present.'
Absent statutory authority, an administrative agency's right to
disallow a petitioner to withdraw his application without leave was
once denied in a federal cause celebre.113 However, as to a request to
transfer a liquor license, this right has now been affirmed.' Even the
commencement of a session at one in the morning that eventually
lasted five hours has been held not an abuse of discretion, in the
absence of proof of harm by the objecting party.'
Local agency power to compel testimonial and other evidence, in
aid of investigation and adjudicative functions, did not bring much
grist to the judicial mill during the period under investigation. The
most obvious reason is that legislatures rarely confer this power on
parochial functionaries, and judges are reluctant to read it into grants
of authority simply to investigate or decide.17 When conferred by
enactment, the courts today tend to enforce the power ungrudgingly,'"
subject to such restrictions as seem necessary to prevent oppressive
use. 78 There is no apparent tendency to distinguish between local and
statewide agencies.
The somewhat related question of the availability of discovery
procedures,' 79 in the absence of enacted law, has not received much
attention in the cases surveyed. The only two decisions found relate to
alleged unfairness in not making available to a respondent in
disciplinary proceedings material in the agencies' possession. In each
instance, the court, with apparent reason, found that no unfairness
had been demonstrated.'
F. Evidence
Normally, as one might expect, adjudication must be based upon
evidence.' With such a truism, it is surprising how many cases
171. Williams v. Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, 118 Ga. App. 271, 163 S.E.2d 239 (1968).
172. Gibson v. Board of Zoning App., 250 Md. 292, 242 A.2d 137 (1968).
173. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. I (1936).
174. Beacon Restaurant, Inc. v. Adamo, 241 A.2d 291 (R.I. 1968).
175. Williams v. Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, 118 Ga. App. 271, 163 S.E.2d 239 (1968).
176. See Jewell v. McCann, 95 Ohio St. 191, 166 N.E. 42 (1917).
177. Finance Comm'n v. Basile, 236 N.E.2d 520 (Mass. 1968).
178. Weintraub v. Fraiman, 30 App. Div. 2d 784, 291 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
179. See I F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 316-21 (1967).
180. McCallister v. Priest, 422 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968); Hooper v. Goldstein, 241 A.2d
809 (R.I. 1968).
181. Raposo v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 243 A.2d 99 (R.I. 1968). A brief is not
"evidence". Civil Serv. Bd. v. Page, 2 N.C. App. 34, 162 S.E.2d 644 (1968).
[VOL. 22
1969] LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
involve reversals of agencies for default in this regard.182 Generally,
these cases involve merely overlooking a want of proof on some
relatively narrow, though essential point.1n An adjunct to the necessity
for taking evidence is the opportunity for reasonable cross-
examination in appropriate situations,184 regardless of whether statutes
or rules make any' provision on the subject. 185 This right may be
waived by a failure to demand the opportunity.' The burden of proof
is upon the one seeking action, whether the agency' or a "suitor." 88
Closely related to this problem of burden of proof in the
persuasional sense are the questions of the kind of evidence the
agencies may consider and the propriety of so-called official
notice-something that goes beyond the bounds of conventional
judicial notice. 9 Broadly speaking, in the absence of statute, three
rules have developed.' First, agencies must follow the rules of
admissibility developed for trials at common law. Second, agencies
are not bound to follow the common law, but may admit and credit
whatever qualifies as that "on which responsible persons are
accustomed to rely in serious affairs."'' This is the so-called
182. See Box v. Board of Bldg. Standards and Bldg. App., 15 Ohio Misc. 17, 238 N.E.2d
578 (1968); Pellini v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 238 A.2d 744 (R.I. 1968); lannuccillo v. Zoning Bd.
of Rev., 236 A.2d 253 (R.I. 1967).
183. Nordstrom v. Hansford, 435 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1968);.Cutright v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
90 Ill. App. 2d 289, 232 N.E.2d 312 (1967); Brady v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 601, 241
N.E.2d 236, 294 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1968).
184. McCallister v. Priest, 422 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968) (not unreasonable to restrict cross-
examination on collateral issues). Where the hearing is of the town meeting type, formal
opportunity for cross-examination is not required, if those interested and their counsel are given
opportunity to sound off at length and to have their questions answered. Katz v. Brandon, 156
Conn. 521, 245 A.2d 579 (1968). One court has denied the necessity of cross-examination by
applying to the adjudication the epithet "legislative", State ex rel. Ruffalo v. Common Council,
38 Wis. 2d 518, 157 N.W.2d 568 (1968).
185. Wadell v. Board of Zoning App., 136 Conn. 1, 68 A.2d 152 (1949); Westminister
Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 238 A.2d 353 (R.I. 1968); City of Spartanburg v.
Parris, Il SE. 2d 228 (S.C. 1968).
186. Gibson v. Board of Zoning App., 250 Md., 292, 242 A.2d 137 (1968).
187. State Tenure Comm'n v. Board of Educ., 213 So. 2d 823 (Ala. 1968); Box v. Board
of Bldg. Standards & Bldg. App:, 15 Ohio Misc. 17, 238 N.E.2d 578 (1968).
188. Dolan v. Zoning Bd. of App., 156 Conn. 426, 242 A.2d 713 (1968); Reagan v.
Heintz, 246 A.2d 710 (Del. Super. Ct. 1968); Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. County of
McHenry, 89 I11. App. 2d 257, 232 N.E.2d 816 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 101 111. App. 2d
230, 241 N.E.2d 454 (1968); Board of County Comm'rs v. Luria, 249 Md. 1, 238 A.2d 108
(1968); Coronet Homes, Inc. v. McKenzie, 439 P.2d 219 (Nev. 1968); Raposo v. Zoning Bd. of
Rev.,* 243 A.2d 99 (R.I. 1968); lannuccillo v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 236 A.2d 253 (R.I. 1967).
189. See I F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 404 (1965); Gellhorn, OJJicial Notice
in Administrative Adjudication, 20 TEX. L. REV. 131 (1931).
190: For a more detailed survey of the authorities, see Merrill, Hearing and Believing:
What Shall We Tell the Administrative Agencies? 45 MINN. L. REV. 525 (1961).
191. See NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938).
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"substantial evidence" or in better terms, the "convincing evidence"
rule. Finally, there is the pseudo-liberal rule that any evidence may be
accepted, but that each necessary finding of fact must be supported by
some "residuum" of common law competent evidence, however
fragile a smidgen it may be.
As discussed earlier, rarely are there statutory provisions
applicable to local agencies, and no decisions turning on provisions of
this sort have been found in the materials examined for this article.'
Of course, in those jurisdictions enacting one of the two versions of
the Model State Administrative Procedure Act to apply to local
agencies, its provisions governing evidence will apply. The reported
cases, however, do not shed clear light on what happens in the
absence of statute. Missouri appears to approve the residuum rule.,"
Results in Illinois,'94 Maryland," 5  Massachusetts,"' Rhode Island,"7
and perhaps Louisiana 198 appear consistent with the convincing
evidence rule. There seems no intimation that the rules applicable to
local agencies should differ from those governing tribunals of
statewide competence.
Generally, the courts seem insistent that testimony be under
oath. 99 Quite a number of cases concerned minutiae such as the
latitude with which the trier of fact may weigh the failure to produce
192. According to one case, a charter provision that the zoning board shall not be bound
by technical rules of evidence is declaratory only, since the same rule would obtain even without
legislation. Neuman v. City of Baltimore, 251 Md. 92, 2-46 A.2d 583 (1968).
193. McCallister v. Priest, 422 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968) (improper to admit hearsay but
reception doesn't call for reversal, if sufficient competent evidence to sustain decision).
194. Western Pride Builders v. City of Berwyn, 240 N.E.2d 269 (!11. Ct. App. 1968)
(statement in letter).
195. Neuman v. City of Baltimore, 251 Md. 92, 246 A.2d 583 (1968) (landlord's hearsay
repetition of statment of tenant as to locale from which patronage came); Montgomery County
Council v. Shiental, 249 Md. 194, 238 A.2d 912 (1968) (reporting of zoning body's technical
staff has probative value).
196. Johnson Products, Inc. v. City Council, 353 Mass. 540, 233 N.E.2d 316 (1968)
(view, exhibits, common knowledge in community).
197. Pellini v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 238 A.2d 744 (R.I. 1968). In repelling unsworn
statement of counsel as evidence, court seems to recognize that evidence having "probative
force" would be proper. Note also the liberality as to official notice in Hooper v. Goldstein, 241
A.2d 809 (R.I. 1968).
198. Barlotta v. Jefferson Parish Council, 212 So. 2d 220 (La. App. Ct. 1968) (denial of
liquor license may be on such investigation as council deems necessary).
199. Bowler's Inc. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 97 Ill. App. 2d 403, 240 N.E.2d 369
(1968) (also questionable whether presented as testimony); Box v. Board of Bldg. Standards &
Bldg. App. 15 Ohio Misc. 17, 238 N.E.2d 578 (1968); Pellini v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 238 A.2d
744 (R.I. 1968); But cj. Barlotta v. Jefferson Parish Council, 212 So. 2d 220 (La. Ct. App. 1968);
Johnson Products, Inc. v. City Council, 353 Mass. 540. 233 N.E. 2d 316 (1968).
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an available material witness, °2  or the application of general evidence
statutes, such as the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act.20'
The propriety of expert opinion evidence is often questioned as
dependent upon the witnesses proven expertise 202 or lack thereo 0 3 or
upon the background of specific factual data relevant to the case at
bar which forms the basis for expert testimony.2 4 Whether the subject
is one upon which the view of an expert is needed has also been
raised.20
G. Official Notice
Several cases have questioned the extent to which official notice
may be employed such as in resort to matters not of record, as a basis
for decision. The due process ideal of procedural fairness requires that,
before the proceeding is closed, all the information which could be used
as a basis for decision should be publicly introduced as part of the
material before the tribunal.2 6 Otherwise, affected parties would have
no real opportunity to present all the possible arguments in their favor,
and to have these arguments considered by the tribunal. Of course, for
any matter about which there should be no substantial dispute, short-
cutting proof by the use of judicial notice has always been proper" 7 In
addition, with or without the benefit of statute, courts generally permit
administrative agencies to notice officially matters of specialized
learning related to the field in which the particular agency operates.
Obviously, however, the exercise of this privilege should also be called
to the attention of affected parties, so they may have an opportunity
to make such representations as may seem helpful. Provided the above
conditions are observed, an agency may take official notice of views
by the agency, 28 information accrued to it at prior stages of the
200. Lantini v. Daniels, 247 A.2d 298 (R.I. 1968).
201. McCallister v. Priest, 422 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).
202. Lantini v. Daniels, 247 A.2d 298 (R.I. 1968)(general practitioner may testify as to
psychiatric, matters).
203. Burke v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 238 A.2d 50 (R.I. 1968).
204. Coupe v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 241 A.2d 821 (R.I. 1968).
205. Forest Constr. Co. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 155 Conn. 669, 236 A.2d 917
(1967).
206. Cf Norris v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 156 Conn. 592, 244 A.2d 378 (1968);
Dolan v. Zoning Bd. of App., 156 Conn. 426, 242 A.2d 713 (1968); Allen v. Donovan, 239 A.2d
227 (Del. 1968); Newbrand v. City of Yonkers, 285 N.Y. 164, 33 N.E.2d 75 (1941).
207. Cf UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 10-12.
208. Johnson Products, Inc. v. City Council, 353 Mass. 540, 233 N.E.2d 316 (1968).
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proceedings,." 9 the rules or ordinances under which it functions,"0 and
even matters of common knowledge in the community wherein it
operates.211
One is hard put, however, to justify decisions which seem to
uphold secret receipt of post hearing evidence, unless the material
received can be treated as merely supplemental to that which the
persons affected already have had the opportunity to meet. Resort
to the agency's undisclosed knowledge can never be condoned.
213
Resort to notice of the agency's files and the information therein may
be the duty as well as the privilege of the agency, in so far as this
resort is essential to the adequate performance of its duty of
decision 1  It has been ruled, upon what seems very sound reasoning,
that the rules or ordinances governing an agency, properly noticed by
it, also are subject to notice by a reViewing court, despite the fact the
same rules or ordinances might not have been eligible for notice in a
judicially initiated proceeding
15
H. Findings and Adjudication
The decision of the tribunal should be based on the evidential and
other qualified material before it. An unauthorized stipulation by an
attorney cannot serve as such a basis.216 Obviously, opportunity must
be given for the presentation of a record adequate for judicial
review.217 In the absence of specific enactment, 218 however, the clear
trend is to hold that stenographic records of the proceedings need not
be prepared;2 19 it is sufficient if an adequate summation is made
209. Forest Constr. Co. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 155 Conn. 669, 236 A.2d
917 (1967).
210. Hooper v. Goldstein, 241 A.2d 809 (R.I. 1968).
211. Johnson Products, Inc. v. City Council, 353 Mass. 540, 233 N.E.2d 316 (1968).
212. See Hawkes v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 156 Conn. 207, 240 A.2d 914
(1968).
213. See Barlotta v. Jefferson Parish Council, 212 So. 2d 220 (La. Ct. App. 1968).
214. Brady v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 601, 241 N.E.2d 236, 294 N.Y.S.2d 215
(1968).
215. See Hooper v. Goldstein, 241 A.2d 809 (R.I. 1968).
216. Rossi v. School Comm'n, 237 N.E.2d 680 (Mass. 1968).
217. See State ex rel. Ruffalo v. Common Council, 38 Wis. 2d 518, 157 N.W.2d 568
(1968).
218. lannuccillo v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 516, 236 A.2d 353 (1967), and
Wallace v. Murphy, 21 N.Y.2d 433, 235 N.E.2d 759, 288 N.Y.S. 2d 613 (1968), afford examples
of decisions under such statutes.
219. See Dipietro v. City of Nashua, 246 A.2d 695 (N.H. 1968); Nelson v. Board of
Exam'rs of Bd. of Educ., 21 N.Y.2d 408, 235 N.E.2d 433, 288 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1968).
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available z° Indeed, since no record need be prepared, the burden of
furnishing one may be placed on the party seeking review. 221 The
existence of two records, one a full transcript of the proceedings and
the other a "re-cap" in summary form, is not so confusing or
impeditive of review as to vitiate the proceedings 22
As a means to effective review of agency action and to implement
the standards imposed for agency guidance, our administrative law
lays great weight upon the need for the expression of findings upon all
essential issues of fact. This procedure is invoked whether required by
statute or not.22 As to local tribunals, for example, decisions were
rested on the Model Administrative Procedure Act,224 on specific
provisions of governing statutes or ordinances, 22  or on the basic
inference from the jurisdiction to hear and decide 2  Moreover, to
insure that the objective behind the requirement of findings is
achieved, decisions require that the findings be specific227 and
definite. 228 A mere parroting of the language of the statutory
standard229 is insufficient,23° or is a general conclusion,21  unless the
issue is so narrow that such a general statement adequately depicts the
220. See Nelson v. Board of Exam'rs of Bd. of Educ., 221 N.Y.2d 408, 235 N.E.2d 433,
288 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1968).
221. lannuccillo v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 516, 236 A.2d 353 (1967); In re
Gruber, 89 Okla. 148, 214 P. 690 (1923). But see Johnson v. Village of Cohasset, 263 Minn. 425,
116 N.W. 2d 692 (1962).
222. First Nat'l Bank v. Sheehan, 57 Misc. 2d 311, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 733 (Sup. Ct.), affd,
30 App. Div. 2d 912, 292 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1968).
223. See 2 COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 465-72 (1965).
224. See Glenn v. Board of County Comm'rs, 440 P.2d I (Wyo. 1968).
225. Moss v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 68 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Ct. App. 1968):
Harrington Glen, Inc. v. Municipal Bd. of Adjustment, 52 N.J. 22, 243 A.2d 233 (1968).
226. J & M Realty Co. v. City of Norwalk, 156 Conn. 185, 239 A.2d 534 (1968); Vahle v.
Zoning Bd. of App., 97 Ill. App. 2d 165, 239 N.E.2d 865 (1968); Hooper v. Goldstein, 241
A.2d 809 (R.I. 1968).
227. Hooper v. Goldstein, 241 A.2d 809 (R.I. 1968) (six charges, amounting to accusation
of but one wrongful act; finding of guilty of one and not guilty of remainder does not show
adequately what tribunal determined).
228. See Nani v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 242 A.2d 403 (R.I. 1968) (failure to resolve
evidentiary conflict); Bonitati Bros. v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 242 A.2d 692 (R.l. 1968) (failure to
show relationship between proposed use and increased traffic congestion or hazards).
229. The importance of definite standards is highlighted by the recent "cigarette
dialogue." Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
230. Harrington Glen, Inc. v. Municipal Bd. of Adjustment, 52 N.J. 22, 243 A.2d 233
(1968). Contra, Carlton v. Board of Zoning App., 235 N.E.2d 503 (Ind. Ct. App.), allowing the
use of a printed form parroting the several elements of the standards for granting variances, with
blanks for marks indicating assent or dissent. A strong dissenting opinion is much the better
reasoned.
23 1. RK Dev. Corp. v. City of Norwalk, 156 Conn. 369, 242 A.2d 781 (1968).
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ground of the administrative decision.2 32 A motion that findings be
prepared is obviously not equivalent to findings.P
3
The findings must respond to all the issues posed. 234 In some
instances, however, judges are able to declare a finding implicit if no
other confusing issues are present and the decision would be
impossible without the finding implied.? 5 However, this technique
involves a dangerous laxity that should be invoked with great caution.
These local tribunals, so often staffed by laymen prone to strut in
their little brief authority, tend to confuse their emotions with their
powers. It is highly desirable that they be required to keep constantly
in mind the limits wherein they are to operate.2 3 Some cases,
unfortunately, allow extremely sloppy findings to pass judicial
scrutiny. 37 Of course, only those findings appropriate to the statutory
standard are required
38
In some instances, enacted law requires adjudication within a
specified time after the conclusion of a hearing. Properly, it is
suggested, such a requirement has been held to be directory, only, so
that a determination made after the lapse of more than the specified
period is not open to attack on the ground of delay 39 It is suggested
that, likewise, mandamus should not lie to compel a decision within
the time limit or immediately following its expiration. If the
legislature really wants to insure that the adjudication will terminate
in one way or another by a date certain, it should so state in express
language 40
Decision should be the product of a regularly convened meeting
of the agency, not of an informal discussion. 4' In the absence of
232. O'Bryant v. Theobald, 421 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1967) ("charges . . . are sustained");
Independent School Dist. No. 316 v. Eckert, 161 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 1968) (only one ground
charged, all evidence related to single event, facts not in dispute).
233. Moss v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 68 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Ct. App. 1968),
234. Aubinoe v. Lewis, 250 Md. 645, 244 A.2d 879 (1968); Gougeon v. Board of
Adjustment, 52 N.J. 212, 245 A.2d 7 (1968); Bonitati Bros. v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 242 A.2d
692 (R.I. 1968); Glenn v. Board of County Comm'rs, 440 P.2d I (Wyo. 1968).
235. Thayer v. Baybutt, 29 App. Div. 2d 486. 289 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1968): Pomerantz v.
Lehmann, 55 Misc. 2d 315. 285 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 19671.
236. Blanchard v. Police Dept., 210 So. 2d 585 (La. App. 1968).
237. First Nat'l Bank v. Sheehan, 30 App. Div. 2d 912, 292 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1968); Smith
v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 241 A.2d 288 (R.I. 1968).
238. Gonsalves v. Dairy Valley, 71 Cal. Rptr. 255 (Ct. App. 1968); First Nat'l Bank v.
Sheehan, 30 App. Div. 2d 912, 292 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1968).
239. Donohue v. Zoning Bd. of App., 155 Conn. 550, 235 A.2d 643 (1967).
240. See Report of Committee on Administrative Law Procedure, 23 OKLA. BAR Ass'N J.
1551, 1560 (1952) ( § 19 of draft).
241. Ziomek v. Bartimole, 156 Conn. 604, 244 A.2d 380 (1968).
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express provision, a majority of a quorum of a collegiately orjanized
tribunal may render a decision 412 Some statutes, especially in zoning
matters, probably to counteract the tendency of zoning bodies to act
either politically or emotionally, require decision by an extraordinary
vote.?13 One recent case illustrates the working of a statute" which,
rightly or wrongly, has been construed to require decision, not only by
a full tribunal,245 but by persons who have personally heard the
evidence.26 The result, somewhat similar to that prescribed by the
revised model state administrative procedure act,2 47 may be sound
policy; it hardly follows from the legislative language: "an auxiliary
or sixth member of said board . who shall sit as an active member
when and if a member of said board is unable to serve at any time,
upon request of the chair.man of said board." ' " The order is not
vitiated by minor errors in the transcript of the hearing.249 However,
all essential parts of the order must appear therein with clarity; an
incorporation by reference does not suffice.250 The order must conform
to the statutory vesting of authority;25 if it does so conform, it is
sufficient!
2
I. Rehearing and Review
Quite a number of decisions have dealt with the problem of
agency authority to reconsider or to rehear action in adjudicative
matters. So long as there has been no final vote, the agency is free to
alter any tentative accord to which it may have arrived. 253 If a
242. Bray v. Barry, 91 R.I. 34, 160 A.2d 577 (1960); Endeavor-Oxford Union Free High
School District v. valters, 270 Wis. 561, 72 N.W.2d 535 (1955).
243. Real Properties, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 311 Mass. 430,42 N.E.2d 499 (1942).
244. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-24-14 (1956).
245. Kent v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 229 A.2d 769 (R.I. 1967).
246. Coderre v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 239 A.2d 729 (R.I. 1968).
247. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revised Model
State Administrative Procedure Act § 11 (1961).
248. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-24-14 (1956).
249. First Nat'l Bank v. Sheehan, 30 App. Div. 2d 912, 292 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1968)
(transcript did not show chairman voting; his name appeared in resolution).
250. Suburban Club of Larkfield, Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 57 Misc. 2d 1051, 294
N.Y.S.2d 4 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
251. McCallister v. Priest, 422 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968) (limit of power to reassignment
and reduction in rank as distinguished from dismissal).
252. Caruso v. Planning Bd., 238 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. 1968) (waiver of substantive rules);
Jeffrey v. Planning Bd. of Rev., 239 A.2d 731 (R.I. 1968) (waiver of substantive rules).
253. Toffolon v. Zoning Bd. of App., 155 Conn. 558, 236 A.2d 96 (1967). Three levels of
hdministrative authority were involved in Garner v. Lumberton Independent School Dist.,
430 S.W.2d 418"(Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
1969]
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
decision has been achieved, however, the cases display the same
diversity of view presented by the general law as to "inherent"
authority of an agency incident to the power to grant a rehearing;
some cases affirm the power,2 54 others deny it.255 Express enactment
may grant the authorityz56 or may indicate the intent that action,
once taken, shall be finalV57 Other statutes may allow the reopening
upon a showing of changed circumstances!" s Under some statutes a
formal motion for rehearing is prerequisite to a grant thereof.2 11 In
any event, rehearing is available only while the matter still is within
the administrative power; the institution of an action seeking judicial
review terminates the right to grant rehearing 60 If an adjudicative
order is annulled, the agency261 has authority to proceed, within its
jurisdiction, as though there had been no action.
The device of an administrative review of the decisions of a lower
tribunal, frequently used in federal and state structures, occasionally is
found at the local level. It is quite common, of course, in zoning
matters where review boards, variously characterized, are used to
consider appeals from the decisions of building inspectors, and like
functionaries 2  Always, the foundation for the reviewing authority
must lie in enacted law 63 Review is limited to the matters covered by
the enactment .2  Such provisions do not apply to a failure to perform
a ministerial duty, such as accordance of a hearing.265 Where it is so
provided, the review must be accorded on the basis of the record before
the subordinate administrator;2 66 otherwise, the review is by a hearing
254. Mackler v. Board of Educ., 16 N.J. 362, 108 A.2d 854 (1954); Handlon v. Town of
Belleville, 4 N.J. 99, 71 A.2d 624 (1950).
255. Klaren v. Board of Fire and Police Comm'rs, 240 N.E. 2d 535 (111. Ct. App. 1968);
Meredith v. Sears, 427 S.W.2d 813 (Ky. 1968).
256. Mendozza v. Board of Zoning App., 30 App. Div. 2d 863, 292 N.Y.S.2d 723 (1968);
Boeing Co. v. King County, 449 P.2d 404 (Wash. 1969).
257. Morton v. Mayor, 102 N.J. Super. 84, 245 A.2d 377 (1968). The court reads more
into the legislative language than this author should have found.
258. Rosedale-Skinker Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Adjustment, 425 S.W.2d 929 (Mo.
1968).
259. Dijiietro v. City of Nashua, 246 A.2d 695 (N.H. 1968).
260. Morton v. Mayor, 102 N.J. Super. 84, 245 A.2d 377 (1968).
261. Moss v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 68 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Ct. App. 1968).
262. Western Pride Builders, Inc., v. City of Berwyn, 240 N.E.2d 269 (i11. Ct. App. 1968);
Board of Zoning App. v. Stevens, 233 N.E.2d 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968).
263. Board of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 443 P.2d 502 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968); Mauran
v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 247 A.2d 853 (R.I. 1968).
264. O'Bryant v. Theobald, 421 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1967); Lunter v. Laudeman, 246 A.2d
540 (Md. 1968); H.A. Steen Indus. v. Cavanaugh, 430 Pa. 10, 241 A.2d 771 (1968).
265. Beacon Restaurant v. Adamo, 241 A.2d 291 (R.I. 1968).
266. J.D. Constr. Corp. v. Isaacs, 51 N.J. 263, 239 A.2d 657 (1968).
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de novo, at least in the weighing of the evidence! 7 The reviewing
authority may modify, affirm or reverse, the determination below, under
properly drawn statutes.2 8 Administrative review of rule making by
local agencies is accorded under the statutes of at least one state 69
The courts are quite rightly of the opinion that, in the absence of
statute, there is certainly no right to rely upon the advice of a local
official as to how to obtain review or other statutory relief?7 Such
advice cannot be the source of estoppel against application of the
social interest expressed through enacted statutes and ordinances .27  In
only one instance, during the period examined, has a contrary ruling
been discovered 72 The elements of public policy mentioned render it
impossible to approve the decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
This concludes our survey of the current decisions which shed
light upon the position of the local administrative agencies. The one
topic of substance left uncovered is judicial supervision and review.
Many considerations have united to preclude treatment here. The
problems are manifold, exhaustive and variant, requiring far more space
than should be added to this article. Also, statutory provisions differ
from state to state and within individual states, and decisions would
have to be compared with and geared to these statutes to an extent
that could not profitably be attempted here. Extensive localized studies
of materials in the several states probably would be far more profitable
than a discussion based on a limited survey of the decisions nationwide.
What conclusions may we draw from our survey? Perhaps the
most significant conclusion is that, absent specific statutory directives,
judicially imposed requirements for the conduct of local
administrative bodies do not vary markedly from those applied to
agencies of statewide jurisdiction.
267. Metropolitan Dade County v. Corozzo, 212 So. 2d 891 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968);
Bowler's Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 97 II1. App. 2d 403, 240 N.E.2d 369 (1968);
Lorena Independent School Dist. No. 907, v. Rosenthal Common School Dist. No. 007, 421
S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
268. Trotman v. Hoberman, 50 Misc. 2d 915, 290 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
269. Burton v. State App. Bd., 38 Wisc. 2d 294, 156 N.W.2d 386 (1968).
270. Davis v. Wilson, 96 Ill. App. 2d 225, 238 N.E.2d 237 (1968). See also Olds v.
DeMarco, 94 I1. App. 2d 443, 237 N.E.2d 354 (1968).
271. Bankus v. City of Brookings, 449 P.2d 646 (Ore. 1969); Stratford Arms, Inc. v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 429 Pa. 132, 239 A.2d 325 (1968); Segaloff v. City of Newport
News, 209 Va. 259, 163 S.E.2d 135 (1968); Village of Wind Point v. Halverson, 38 Wisc. 2d I,
155 N.W.2d 654 (1968).
272. Tillberg v. Township of Kearny, 103 N.J. Super. 324, 247 A.2d 161 (1968).
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We have found it increasingly desirable, both procedurally and
substantively, to tighten the supervision of the agencies of statewide
competence. Perhaps we should do the same for the local agencies. If
the courts are going to hold local agencies to the same requirements
as' the state agencies whenever the statutes are silent or obscure, the
local agencies cannot be disadvantaged seriously by ,having like
requirements imposed legislatively. A corresponding observation seems
apt with respect to cities which, by constitutional home rule or by
legislative largesse, are accorded substantial freedom in their handling
of local matters. They, too, should give attention to the problem of
bettering the framework of the law within which administrative action
is taken. The problem need not be solved in lonely isolation. Most
states have organizations of city governments that afford sophisticated
programs for common deliberation, for the interchange of
information, even for cooperative effort. It should be possible,
therefore, to work out better structures for the organization and
procedure for our local agencies. Too, this would advance the interests
of uniformity, an important desideratum in these days of wide-ranging
enterprise and mobility of people.
Another reflection is that the cases, as would be expected, involve
"trouble" situations, those instances wherein someone has taken
sufficient exception to what has been done to bring the matter into
court and to pursue his claim to the point that it gets into the
reported decisions. Obviously, the material thus brought to light,
though it seems to bulk large, is only the tip of the iceberg of local
administrative action. Hence, I suspect that much is done informally
in manners that do not at all comport with the standards which the
courts enforce when the trouble situations are brought to their
attention. In many instances, this haphazard, extra legal conduct
probably works out to the mutual advantage of everyone involved.
However, one cannot get rid of the uneasy feeling that, all too often,
people may lose out on what is their due simply because they do not
know the law or because they do not think it would be worth while to
protest legally. Hence, along with tightening the guides for our
administrators, we should educate them in what they should do to
accord administrative justice, and indoctrinate in them the desire to
accord it.
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